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Abstract
Releasing person-specific data could potentially reveal sensitive information about
individuals. k-anonymization is a promising privacy protection mechanism in data
publishing. Although substantial research has been conducted on k-anonymization
and its extensions in recent years, only a few prior works have considered releasing
data for some specific purpose of data analysis. This paper presents a practical data
publishing framework for generating a masked version of data that preserves both
individual privacy and information usefulness for cluster analysis. Experiments on
real-life data suggest that by focusing on preserving cluster structure in the masking
process, the cluster quality is significantly better than the cluster quality of the
masked data without such focus. The major challenge of masking data for cluster
analysis is the lack of class labels that could be used to guide the masking process.
Our approach converts the problem into the counterpart problem for classification
analysis, wherein class labels encode the cluster structure in the data, and presents
a framework to evaluate the cluster quality on the masked data.
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1 Introduction
Information sharing is a vital building block for today’s business world. In June
2004, the Information Technology Advisory Committee released a report en-
titled Revolutionizing Health Care Through Information Technology [31]. A
key point is the establishment of a nationwide system of electronic medical
records that encourages sharing medical knowledge through computer-assisted
clinical decision support. The report states that “all information about a pa-
tient from any source could be securely available to any health care provider
when needed, while assuring patient control over privacy.” However, in many
real-life data publishing scenarios, individual participants (e.g., the patients)
do not even have the right to opt out from the sharing. For example, licensed
hospitals in California are required to submit specific demographic data on ev-
ery patient discharged from their facility [7]. Thus, the burden of data privacy
protection falls on the shoulder of the data holder (e.g., the hospital). This
paper presents a technical response to the demand for simultaneous privacy
protection and information sharing, specifically for the task of cluster analysis.
In this paper, we define the data publishing scenario as follows. Consider a
person-specific data table T with patients’ information on Zip code, Birthplace,
Gender, and Disease. The data holder wants to publish T to some recipient
for cluster analysis. However, if a set of attributes, called a Quasi-Identifier
or a QID, on {Zip code, Birthplace, Gender} is so specific that few people
match it, publishing the table will lead to linking a unique or small number
of individuals with the sensitive information on Disease. Even if the currently
published table T does not contain sensitive information, individuals in T
can be linked to the sensitive information in some (readily available) external
source by a join on the common attributes [33][40]. The problem studied in
this paper is to generate a masked version of T that satisfies two requirements:
the anonymity requirement and the clustering requirement.
Anonymity Requirement: To protect privacy, instead of publishing the raw
table T (QID, Sensitive attribute), the data holder publishes a masked table
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T ∗, where QID is a set of quasi-identifying attributes masked to some general
concept. For example,QID = {Zip code, Birthplace, Gender}. The data holder
could generalize the values in Birthplace from city level to region level so that
more records will match the generalized description and, therefore, individu-
als who match the description will become less identifiable. The anonymity
requirement is specified by k-anonymity [33][40]: A masked table T ∗ satisfies
k-anonymity if each record in T ∗ shares the same value on QID with at least
k − 1 other records, where k is an anonymity threshold specified by the data
holder. 1 All records in the same QID group are made indistinguishable and,
therefore, it is difficult to determine whether a matched individual actually
has the disease from T ∗.
Clustering Requirement: The data holder wants to publish a masked table
T ∗ to a recipient for the purpose of cluster analysis, the goal of which is to
group similar objects into the same cluster and group dissimilar objects into
different clusters. We assume that the Sensitive attribute is important for the
task of cluster analysis; otherwise, it should be removed. The recipient may
or may not be known at the time of data publication.
We study the anonymity problem for cluster analysis : For a given anonymity
requirement and a raw data table T , a data holder wants to generate an anony-
mous version of T , denoted by T ∗, that preserves as much of the information
as possible for cluster analysis, and then publish T ∗ to a data recipient. The
data holder, for example, could be a hospital that wants to share its patients’
information with a drug company for pharmaceutical research.
There are many possible masked versions of T ∗ that satisfy the anonymity
requirement. The challenge is how to identify the appropriate one for cluster
analysis. An inappropriately masked version could put originally dissimilar
objects into the same cluster, or put originally similar objects into different
clusters because other masked objects become more similar to each other.
Therefore, a quality-guided masking process is crucial. Unlike the anonymity
problem for classification analysis [12], the anonymity problem for cluster anal-
ysis does not have class labels to guide the masking. Another challenge is that
it is not even clear what “information for cluster analysis” means, nor how to
evaluate the cluster quality of generalized data. In this paper, we define the
anonymity problem for cluster analysis and present a solution framework to
address the challenges in the problem. Our contributions to the literature can
be summarized by answering the following key questions:
(1) Can a masked table simultaneously satisfy both anonymity and cluster-
ing requirements? Our insight is that the two requirements are indeed
dealing with two types of information: The anonymity requirement aims
1 To avoid confusion with the number of clusters k in k-means clustering algorithm
discussed later, we use h to denote anonymity threshold in the rest of this paper.
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at masking identifying information that specifically describes individuals;
the clustering requirement aims at extracting general structures that cap-
ture patterns. If masking is carefully performed, identifying information
can be masked while still preserving the patterns for cluster analysis. Our
experimental results on real-life data support this insight.
(2) What information should be preserved for cluster analysis in the masked
data? We present a framework to convert the anonymity problem for
cluster analysis to the counterpart problem for classification analysis. The
idea is to extract the cluster structure from the raw data, encode it in
the form of class labels, and preserve such class labels while masking the
data. The framework also permits the data holder to evaluate the cluster
quality of the anonymized data by comparing the cluster structures before
and after the masking. This evaluation process is important for data
publishing in practice, but very limited study has been conducted in the
context of privacy preservation and cluster analysis.
(3) Can cluster-quality guided anonymization improve the cluster quality in
anonymous data? A naive solution to the studied privacy problem is
to ignore the clustering requirement and employ some general purpose
anonymization algorithms, e.g., [20], to mask data for cluster analysis.
Extensive experiments suggest that by focusing on preserving cluster
structure in the masking process, the cluster quality outperforms the
cluster quality on masked data without such focus. Our experiments also
demonstrate there is a trade-off between privacy protection and cluster
quality. In general, the cluster quality on the masked data degrades as
the anonymity threshold k increases.
(4) Can the specification of multiple quasi-identifiers improve the cluster qual-
ity in anonymous data? The classic notion of k-anonymity assumes that
a single united quasi-identifier QID contains all quasi-identifying at-
tributes, but research shows that it often leads to substantial loss of data
quality as the QID size increases [1]. Our insight is that, in practice, an
attacker is unlikely to know all identifying attributes of a target victim
(the person being identified), so the data is over-protected by a single
QID. Our proposed method allows the specification of multiple QIDs,
each of which has a smaller size, and therefore avoids over-masking and
improves the cluster quality.
Given that the clustering task is known in advance, why not publish the analy-
sis result instead of the data records? Unlike classification trees and association
rules, publishing the cluster statistics (e.g., cluster centers, together with their
size and radius) usually cannot fulfil the information needs for cluster analysis.
Often, data recipients want to browse into the clustered records to gain more
knowledge. For example, a medical researcher may browse into some clusters
of patients and examine their common characteristics. Publishing data records
not only fulfills the vital requirement for cluster analysis, but also increases
the availability of information for the recipients.
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The paper is organized as follows. We review related works in Section 2, define
the problem in Section 3, present the framework of our approach in Section 4,
and evaluate it in Section 5. Then, we show the extensions of the framework to
achieve other privacy notions in Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Related Works
Recently, the research topic of privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) has
received a great deal of attention in the database and data mining research
communities. The literature in PPDP can be broadly categorized by linkage
prevention models. A privacy violation occurs when a person is linked to a
record or to a value on Sensitive attribute; these violations are called record
linkage and attribute linkage. In both types of violations, the attacker knows
the QID of the victim and that the victim has a record in the released table.
In the attack of record linkage, some value qid on QID identifies a small
number of records in the released table T . If the victim’s QID matches the
value qid, the victim is vulnerable to being linked to the small number of
records in the qid group. In this case, the attacker faces only a small number of
possibilities for the victim’s record, and with the help of additional knowledge,
there is a chance that the attacker could uniquely identify the victim’s record
from the group. The notion of k-anonymity [33][40] and its variations [21][27]
are proposed to prevent record linkage through QID.
In the attack of attribute linkage, the attacker may not precisely identify the
record of the victim, but could infer his or her sensitive values from the pub-
lished data T , based on the set of sensitive values associated with the group
that the victim belongs to. If some sensitive values predominate in a qid group,
a successful inference becomes relatively easy even if k-anonymity is satisfied.
Alternative privacy notions, such as `-diversity [25] and confidence bound-
ing [45][46], are proposed to prevent attribute linkage. The general idea is
to de-associate the correlation between QID and Sensitive attribute so that
even if the attacker can identify the QID group of the victim, the attacker
cannot infer the victim’s sensitive information. The `-diversity requires every
qid group to contain at least ` “well-represented” sensitive values. Thus, a `-
diverse table also satisfies k-anonymity with k = `. Yet, not all privacy notions
that thwart attribute linkages can thwart record linkages. For example, con-
fidence bounding [46] cannot prevent record linkages. [47] proposed a unified
notion of k-anonymity and confidence bounding to prevent both linkages.
Many generalization methods [8][19][20][23][25][39][48][49] have been proposed
to achieve the above mentioned privacy notions, but they use simple qual-
ity measures to guide the masking process and do not consider data min-
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ing tasks such as classification analysis and cluster analysis. As a result, the
data mining results extracted from their anonymous data are often unsatisfac-
tory [12][16][22]. Preserving anonymity for classification analysis was studied
in [4][12][13][16][22][29][43][44][45][46]. The idea was to use the available class
labels to guide the masking process so that the class labels could still be
identified in the masked QID. A genetic algorithm solution was proposed in
[16] to preserve the usefulness to classification in a data table while satisfy-
ing an anonymity requirement. However, it suffered from poor efficiency and
handled only a single quasi-identifier. [4] proposed an algorithm, called K-
Optimize, to identify the optimal k-anonymized version on training data, but
such optimality on the training data does not guarantee the lowest possible
error rate in future (or testing) data. [13] presented a greedy approach to the
same problem based on information gain. [22] proposed a multi-dimensional
generalization method, called InfoGain Mondrian, to identify a k-anonymous
solution. [29][43][44] addressed the extended data publishing scenarios, such
as multiple releases and multiple data holders. [10] presented a suppression
method for anonymizing high-dimensional sequential data.
There are two major differences that distinguish our work from the above
mentioned anonymization algorithms. First, in the anonymization problem
for cluster analysis studied in this paper, no class label is available for guid-
ing the masking process. This creates a new problem in privacy-preserving
data publishing. Second, most of the authors have not proposed algorithms
for anonymizing both continuous and categorical attributes with and without
data holder-specified taxonomy trees. [20] briefly discussed different possi-
ble generalization schemes, but did not show their experimental results. The
anonymization method presented in [22] can anonymize both categorical at-
tributes with taxonomy trees and continuous attributes without taxonomy
trees, but [22] did not discuss how to anonymize categorical attributes with-
out taxonomy trees. Our proposed method presents a unified approach to
mask all these types of attributes; this feature is important for real-life data
anonymization.
There is a family of anonymization methods [2][3] that achieves privacy by
clustering similar data records together. Their objective is very different from
our studied problem, which is publishing data for cluster analysis. [2] proposed
an anonymization approach, called condensation, to first condense the records
into multiple non-overlapping groups in which each group has a size of at
least h records. Then, for each group, the method extracts some statistical
information, such as sum and covariance, that suffices to preserve the mean
and correlation across different attributes. Finally, based on the statistical
information, the method generates synthetic data records for each group. In
a similar spirit, r-gather clustering [3] partitions records into several clusters
such that each cluster contains at least r data points. Then the cluster centers,
together with their size, radius, and a set of associated sensitive values, are
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released. Compared to the masking approach, one limitation of the clustering
approach is that the published records are “synthetic” in that they may not
correspond to the real world entities represented by the raw data. As a result,
the analysis result is difficult to justify if, for example, a police officer wants to
determine the common characteristics of some criminals from the data records.
Many secure protocols have been proposed for distributed computation among
multiple parties. For example, [41] and [15] presented secure protocols to gen-
erate a clustering solution from vertically and horizontally partitioned data
owned by multiple parties. In their model, accessing data held by other parties
is prohibited, and only the final cluster solution is shared among participating
parties. We consider a completely different problem, of which the goal is to
share data that is immunized against privacy attacks.
We highlight some recent development in cluster analysis. [5] presented a
method for clustering parallel data streams. [6] studied the problem of clus-
tering spatial-temporal data. [28] presented a number of efficient clustering
strategies for distributed database. [14] conducted an extensive empirical study
on different clustering methods.
3 Problem Statements
A labelled table has the form T (D1, . . . , Dm, Class) and contains a set of
records of the form 〈v1, . . . , vm, cls〉, where vj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, is a domain
value of attribute Dj, and cls is a class label of the Class attribute. Each Dj
is either a categorical or a continuous attribute. An unlabelled table has the
same form as a labelled table but without the Class attribute.
Suppose that a data holder wants to publish a person-specific table T ∗, but also
wants to protect against linking an individual to sensitive information either
inside or outside T ∗ through some sets of identifying attributes, called quasi-
identifiers QID. A sensitive record linking occurs if some value on a quasi-
identifier is shared by only a small number of records in T ∗. This requirement
is formally defined below.
Definition 3.1 (Anonymity requirement) Consider p quasi-identifiersQID1,
. . ., QIDp on T
∗, where QIDi ⊆ {D1, . . . , Dm} for 1 ≤ i ≤ p. a(qidi) de-
notes the number of data records in T ∗ that share the value qidi on QIDi.
The anonymity of QIDi, denoted by A(QIDi), is the minimum a(qidi) for
any value qidi on QIDi. A table T
∗ satisfies the anonymity requirement
{〈QID1, h1〉, . . . , 〈QIDp, hp〉} if A(QIDi) ≥ hi for 1 ≤ i ≤ p, where QIDi




Rec ID Education Gender Age ... Class Count
1-3 9th M 30 0C1 3C2 3
4-7 10th M 32 0C1 4C2 4
8-12 11th M 35 2C1 3C2 5
13-16 12th F 37 3C1 1C2 4
17-22 Bachelors F 42 4C1 2C2 6
23-26 Bachelors F 44 4C1 0C2 4
27-30 Masters M 44 4C1 0C2 4
31-33 Masters F 44 3C1 0C2 3
34 Doctorate F 44 1C1 0C2 1




















Fig. 1. Taxonomy trees
If someQIDj could be “covered” by anotherQIDi, thenQIDj can be removed
from the anonymity requirement. This observation is stated as follows:
Observation 3.1 (Cover) Suppose QIDj ⊆ QIDi and hj ≤ hi where j 6= i.
If A(QIDi) ≥ hi, then A(QIDj) ≥ hj. We say that QIDj is covered by QIDi;
therefore, QIDj is redundant and can be removed.
Example 3.1 Consider the data in Table 1 and taxonomy trees in Figure 1.
Ignore the dashed line in Figure 1 for now. The table has 34 records, with
each row representing one or more raw records that agree on (Education,
Gender, Age). The Class column stores a count for each class label. The
anonymity requirement 〈QID1 = {Education,Gender}, 4〉 states that every
existing qid1 in the table must be shared by at least 4 records. Therefore,
〈9th,M〉, 〈Masters,F〉, 〈Doctorate,F〉 violate this requirement. To make the
“female doctor” less unique, we can generalize Masters and Doctorate to Grad
School. As a result, “she” becomes less identifiable by being one of the four
females who have a graduate degree in the masked table T ∗.
Definition 3.1 generalizes the classic notion of k-anonymity [34] by allowing
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multiple QIDs with different anonymity thresholds. The specification of mul-
tiple QIDs is based on an assumption that the data holder knows exactly
what external information source is available for sensitive record linkage. The
assumption is realistic in some data publishing scenarios. Suppose that the
data holder wants to release a table T ∗(A,B,C,D, S), where A, B, C, D are
identifying attributes and S is a sensitive attribute, and knows that the recip-
ient has access to previously released tables T1∗(A,B,X) and T2∗(C,D, Y ),
where X and Y are attributes not in T . To prevent linking the records in T
to X or Y , the data holder only has to specify the anonymity requirement
on QID1 = {A,B} and QID2 = {C,D}. In this case, enforcing anonymity
on QID = {A,B,C,D} will distort the data more than is necessary. Most
previous works suffer from this over-masking problem because they simply in-
clude all potential identifying attributes into a single QID. The experimental
results in Section 5 confirm that the specification of multiple QIDs can reduce
masking and, therefore, improve the data quality.
Masking operations: To transform a table T to satisfy an anonymity re-
quirement, we apply one of the following three types of masking operations
on every attribute Dj in ∪QIDi: If Dj is a categorical attribute with pre-
specified taxonomy tree, then we generalize Dj. Specifying taxonomy trees,
however, requires expert knowledge of the data. In case the data holder lacks
such knowledge or, for any reason, does not specify a taxonomy tree for the
categorical attribute Dj, then we suppress Dj. If Dj is a continuous attribute
without a pre-discretized taxonomy tree, then we discretize Dj.
2 These three
types of masking operations are formally described as follows:
(1) Generalize Dj if it is a categorical attribute with a taxonomy tree speci-
fied by the data holder. Figure 1 shows the taxonomy trees for categorical
attributes Education and Gender. A leaf node represents a domain value
and a parent node represents a less specific value. A generalized Dj can
be viewed as a “cut” through its taxonomy tree. A cut of a tree is a sub-
set of values in the tree, denoted Cutj, that contains exactly one value
on each root-to-leaf path. Figure 1 shows a cut on Education and Gen-
der, indicated by the dash line. If a value v is generalized to its parent,
all siblings of v must also be generalized to its parent. This property
ensures that a value and its ancestor values will not coexist in the gen-
eralized table T ∗. This generalization scheme was previously employed
in [4][11][12][16][43][44].
(2) Suppress Dj if it is a categorical attribute without a taxonomy tree.
Suppressing a value on Dj means replacing all occurrences of the value
with the special value ⊥j. All suppressed values on Dj are represented by
the same value ⊥j. We use Supj to denote the set of values suppressed
2 A continuous attribute with a pre-discretized taxonomy tree is equivalent to a
categorical attribute with a pre-specified taxonomy tree.
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by ⊥j. This type of suppression is performed at the value level, in that
Supj in general contains a subset of the values in the attribute Dj. A
clustering algorithm treats ⊥j as a new value. Suppression can be viewed
as a special case of generalization by considering ⊥j to be the root of a
taxonomy tree and child(⊥j) to contain all domain values of Dj. In this
special case of generalization (which we call it suppression), we could
selectively generalize (suppress) some values in child(⊥j) to ⊥j while
some other values in child(⊥j) remain intact.
(3) Discretize Dj if it is a continuous attribute. Discretizing a value v on
Dj means replacing all occurrences of v with an interval containing the
value. Our algorithm dynamically grows a taxonomy tree for intervals at
runtime. Each node represents an interval. Each non-leaf node has two
child nodes representing some optimal binary split of the parent interval.
Figure 1 shows such a dynamically grown taxonomy tree for Age, where
[1−99) is split into [1−37) and [37−99). More details will be discussed in
Section 4.2.1. A discretized Dj can be represented by the set of intervals,
denoted Intj, corresponding to the leaf nodes in the dynamically grown
taxonomy tree of Dj.
A masked table T can be represented by 〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉, where Cutj,
Supj, Intj are defined above. If the masked table T
∗ satisfies the anonymity re-
quirement, then 〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉 is called a solution set. Generalization,
suppression, and discretization have their own merits and flexibility; therefore,
our unified framework employs all of them.
What kind of information should be preserved for cluster analysis? Unlike clas-
sification analysis, wherein the information utility of attributes can be mea-
sured by their power of identifying class labels [4][12][16][22], no class labels
are available for cluster analysis. One natural approach is to preserve the clus-
ter structure in the raw data. Any loss of structure due to the anonymization
is measured relative to such “raw cluster structure.” We define the anonymity
problem for cluster analysis as follows to reflect this natural choice of approach.
Definition 3.2 (Anonymity problem for cluster analysis) Given an un-
labelled table T , an anonymity requirement {〈QID1, h1〉, . . . , 〈QIDp, hp〉},
and an optional taxonomy tree for each categorical attribute in ∪QIDi, the
anonymity problem for cluster analysis is to mask T on the attributes ∪QIDi
such that the masked table T ∗ satisfies the anonymity requirement and has
a cluster structure as similar as possible to the cluster structure in the raw
table T .
Intuitively, two cluster structures, before and after masking, are similar if the
following two conditions are generally satisfied:
(1) two objects that belong to the same cluster before masking remain in the
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same cluster after masking, and
(2) two objects that belong to different clusters before masking remain in
different clusters after masking.
A formal measure for the similarity of two structures will be discussed in
Section 4.3.
4 Our Approach
In this section, we present an algorithmic framework to generate a masked
table T ∗, represented by a solution set 〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉 that satisfies
a given anonymity requirement and preserves as much as possible the raw
cluster structure.
4.1 Overview of Solution Framework
Figure 2 provides an overview of our proposed framework. First, we gener-
ate the cluster structure in the raw table T and label each record in T by































































Data Holder Data Recipient
Fig. 2. The framework
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contains a class label for each record. Essentially, preserving the raw clus-
ter structure is to preserve the power of identifying such class labels during
masking. Masking that diminishes the difference among records belonging to
different clusters (classes) is penalized. As the requirement is the same as
the anonymity problem for classification analysis, theoretically we can apply
existing anonymization algorithms for classification analysis [4][12][16][22] to
achieve the anonymity, although none of them in practice can perform all of
the three types of masking operations discussed in Section 3. We explain each
step in Figure 2 as follows.
(1) Convert T to a labelled table Tl. Apply a clustering algorithm to T to
identify the raw cluster structure, and label each record in T by its class
label. The resulting labelled table Tl has a Class attribute containing the
labels.
(2) Mask the labelled table Tl. Employ an anonymization algorithm for
classification analysis to mask Tl. The masked T
∗
l satisfies the given
anonymity requirement.
(3) Clustering on the masked T ∗l . Remove the labels from the masked
T ∗l and then apply a clustering algorithm to the masked T
∗
l , where the
number of clusters is the same as in Step 1. By default, the clustering
algorithm in this step is the same as the clustering algorithm in Step
1, but can be replaced with the recipient’s choice if this information is
available. See more discussion below.
(4) Evaluate the masked T ∗l . Compute the similarity between the cluster
structure found in Step 3 and the raw cluster structure found in Step 1.
The similarity measures the loss of cluster quality due to masking. If the
evaluation is unsatisfactory, the data holder may repeat Steps 1-4 with
different specification of taxonomy trees, choice of clustering algorithms,
masking operations, number of clusters, and anonymity thresholds if pos-
sible. We study how these choices could influence the cluster quality in
Section 5.
(5) Release the masked T ∗l . If the evaluation in Step 4 is satisfactory, the
data holder can release the masked T ∗l together with some optional sup-
plementary information: all the taxonomy trees (including those gener-
ated at runtime for continuous attributes), the solution set, the similarity
score computed in Step 4, and the class labels generated in Step 1.
In some data publishing scenarios, the data holder does not even know who
the prospective recipients are and, therefore, does not know how the recipients
will cluster the published data. For example, when the Census Bureau releases
data on the World Wide Web, how should the bureau set the parameters, such
as the number of clusters, for the clustering algorithm in Step 1? In this case,
we suggest releasing one version for each reasonable cluster number so that the
recipient can make the choice based on her desired number of clusters, but this
will cause a potential privacy breach because an attacker can further narrow
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down a victim’s record by comparing different releases. A remedy is to employ
the privacy notion of BCF -anonymity [11], which guarantees k-anonymity
even in the presence of multiple releases. The general idea is to first compute
the number of “cracked” records in each QID group by comparing multiple
releases, and then compute the “true” anonymity of a qid group by subtracting
the number of cracked records from the qid group size. Since BCF -anonymity
is a generalized notion of k-anonymity, our privacy-preserving framework for
cluster analysis can easily adopt BCF -anonymity to guarantee anonymization
over multiple releases.
4.2 Anonymization for Classification
The anonymity problem for classification has been studied in [4][12][16][22].
However, none of these anonymization algorithms could perform all masking
operations, namely generalization, suppression, and discretization, specified
in Section 3. To effectively mask both categorical and continuous attributes
in real-life data, we proposed and implemented an anonymization algorithm
called top-down refinement (TDR) that can perform all three types of masking
operations in a unified fashion. TDR shares a similar top-down specialization
(TDS) approach in [12], but TDS cannot perform suppression and, therefore,
cannot handle categorical attributes without taxonomy trees.
TDR takes a labelled table and an anonymity requirement as inputs. The
main idea of TDR is to perform maskings that preserve the information for
identifying the class labels. The next example illustrates this point.
Example 4.1 Suppose that the raw cluster structure produced by Step 1 has
the class (cluster) labels given in the Class attribute in Table 1. In Example 3.1
we generalizeMasters and Doctorate into Grad School to make linking through
(Education,Gender) more difficult. No information is lost in this generalization
because the class label C1 does not depend on the distinction of Masters
and Doctorate. However, further generalizing Bachelors and Grad School to
University makes it harder to separate the two class labels involved.
Instead of masking a labelled table T ∗l starting from the most specific do-
main values, TDR masked T ∗l by a sequence of refinements starting from the
most masked state in which each attribute is generalized to the topmost value,
suppressed to the special value ⊥, or represented by a single interval. TDR
iteratively refines a masked value selected from the current set of cuts, sup-
pressed values, and intervals, and stops if any further refinement would violate
the anonymity requirement. A refinement is valid (with respect to T ∗l ) if T
∗
l
satisfies the anonymity requirement after the refinement.
We formally describe different types of refinements in Section 4.2.1, define a
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selection criterion for a single refinement in Section 4.2.2, and provide the
anonymization algorithm TDR in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Refinement
Refinement for generalization. Consider a categorical attribute Dj with
a pre-specified taxonomy tree. Let T ∗l [v] denote the set of generalized records
that currently contains a generalized value v in the table T ∗l . Let child(v) be
the set of child values of v in a pre-specified taxonomy tree ofDj. A refinement,
denoted by v → child(v), replaces the parent value v in all records in T ∗l [v]
with the child value c ∈ child(v), where c is either a domain value d in the
raw record or c is a generalized value of d. For example, a raw data record r
contains a value Masters and the value has been generalized to University
in a masked table T ∗l . A refinement University → {Bachelors,Grad School}
replaces University in r by Grad School because Grad School is a generalized
value of Masters.
Refinement for suppression. For a categorical attribute Dj without a tax-
onomy tree, a refinement ⊥j → {v,⊥j} refers to disclosing one value v from
the set of suppressed values Supj. Let T
∗
l [⊥j] denote the set of suppressed
records that currently contain ⊥j in the table T ∗l . Disclosing v means replac-
ing ⊥j with v in all records in T ∗l [⊥j] that originally contain v.
Refinement for discretization. For a continuous attribute, refinement is
similar to that for generalization except that no prior taxonomy tree is given
and the taxonomy tree has to be grown dynamically in the process of refine-
ment. Initially, the interval that covers the full range of the attribute forms
the root. The refinement on an interval v, written v → child(v), refers to the
optimal split of v into two child intervals child(v), which maximizes the in-
formation gain. Suppose there are i distinct values in an interval. Then, there
are i − 1 number of possible splits. The optimal split can be efficiently iden-
tified by computing the information gain of each possible split in one scan of
data records containing such an interval of values. See Section 4.2.2 for the
definition of information gain. Due to this extra step of identifying the opti-
mal split of the parent interval, we treat continuous attributes separately from
categorical attributes with taxonomy trees.
4.2.2 Selection Criterion
Each refinement increases information utility and decreases anonymity of the
table because records are more distinguishable by refined values. The key is
selecting the best refinement at each step with both impacts considered. At
each iteration, TDR greedily selects the refinement on value v that has the







1 is added toAnonyLoss(v) to avoid division by zero. Each choice of InfoGain(v)
and AnonyLoss(v) gives a trade-off between classification and anonymization.
We borrow Shannon’s information theory to measure information gain [37].
Consider a categorical attributeDj with pre-specified taxonomy tree. Let T
∗[v]
denote the set of records generalized to the value v and let T ∗[c] denote the set
of records generalized to a child value c in child(v) after specializing v. Let |x|
be the number of elements in a set x. |T ∗[v]| = ∑c |T ∗[c]|, where c ∈ child(v).





where I(T ∗[x]) is the entropy of T ∗[x] [37]:
I(T ∗[x]) = −∑
cls
freq(T ∗[x], cls)
|T ∗[x]| × log2
freq(T ∗[x], cls)
|T ∗[x]| . (3)
freq(T [x], cls) is the number of data records in T ∗[x] having the class cls.
Intuitively, I(T ∗[x]) measures the entropy (or “impurity”) of classes in T [x].
The more dominating the majority class in T ∗[x], the smaller I(T ∗[x]) is (i.e.,
less entropy in T ∗[x]). Therefore, I(T ∗[x]) measures the error because non-
majority classes are considered as errors. InfoGain(v) then measures the
reduction of entropy after refining v. InfoGain(v) is non-negative. For more
details on information gain and classification, see [32].
AnonyLoss(v) = avg{A(QIDi)− Av(QIDi)}, (4)
where A(QIDi) and Av(QIDi) represent the anonymity before and after re-
fining v. avg{A(QIDi) − Av(QIDi)} is the average loss of anonymity for all
QIDi that contain the attribute of v.
If Dj is a categorical attribute without taxonomy tree, the refinement ⊥j →
{v,⊥j}means refining T ∗[⊥j] into T ∗[v] and T ∗′ [⊥j], where T ∗[⊥j] denotes the
set of records containing ⊥j before the refinement, T ∗[v] and T ∗′ [⊥j] denote
the set of records containing v and ⊥j after the refinement, respectively. We
employ the same Score(v) function to measure the goodness of the refinement
⊥j → {v,⊥j}, except that InfoGain(v) is now defined as:







4.2.3 The Anonymization Algorithm (TDR)
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Algorithm 1 Top-Down Refinement (TDR)
1: Initialize every value of Dj to the topmost value or suppress every value of Dj
to ⊥j or include every continuous value of Dj into the full range interval, where
Dj ∈ ∪QIDi.
2: Initialize Cutj of Dj to include the topmost value, Supj of Dj to include all
domain values of Dj , and Intj of Dj to include the full range interval, where
Dj ∈ ∪QIDi.
3: while some candidate x in 〈∪Cutj ,∪Supj ,∪Intj〉 is valid do
4: Find the Best refinement from 〈∪Cutj ,∪Supj ,∪Intj〉.
5: Perform Best on T ∗l and update 〈∪Cutj ,∪Supj ,∪Intj〉.
6: Update Score(x) and validity for x∈〈∪Cutj ,∪Supj ,∪Intj〉.
7: end while
8: return Masked T ∗l and 〈∪Cutj ,∪Supj ,∪Intj〉.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the conceptual algorithm. All attributes not in ∪QIDi
are removed from T ∗l , and duplicates are collapsed into a single row with the
Class column storing the count for each class label. Initially, Cutj contains
only the topmost value for a categorical attribute Dj with a taxonomy tree,
Supj contains all domain values of a categorical attribute Dj without a taxon-
omy tree, and Intj contains the full range interval for a continuous attribute
Dj. The valid refinements in 〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉 form the set of candidates.
At each iteration, we find the candidate of the highest Score, denoted Best
(Line 4), apply Best to T ∗ and update 〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉 (Line 5), and up-
date Score and the validity of the candidates in 〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉 (Line
6). The algorithm terminates when there is no more candidate in 〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉,
in which case it returns the masked table together with the solution set
〈∪Cutj,∪Supj,∪Intj〉.
The following example illustrates how to achieve a given anonymity require-
ment by performing a sequence of refinements, starting from the most masked
table.
Example 4.2 Consider the labelled table in Table 1, where Education and
Gender have pre-specified taxonomy trees and the anonymity requirement:
{〈QID1 = {Education,Gender}, 4〉, 〈QID2 = {Gender,Age}, 11〉}.
Initially, all data records are masked to
〈ANY Edu,ANY Gender, [1− 99)〉,
and
∪Cuti = {ANY Edu,ANY Gender, [1− 99)}.
To find the next refinement, we compute the Score for each of ANY Edu,
ANY Gender, and [1-99). Table 2 shows the masked data after performing
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the following refinements in order:
[1− 99)→ {[1− 37), [37− 99)}
ANY Edu→ {Secondary, University}
Secondary → {JuniorSec., Senior Sec.}
Senior Sec.→ {11th, 12th}
University → {Bachelors,Grad School}.
The solution set ∪Cuti is:
{JuniorSec., 11th, 12th,Bachelors,GradSchool, ANY Gender, [1− 37), [37− 99)}.
4.3 Evaluation
This step compares the raw cluster structure found in Step 1 in Section 4.1,
denoted by C, with the cluster structure found in the masked data in Step
3, denoted by Cg. Both C and Cg are extracted from the same set of records,
so we can evaluate their similarity by comparing their record groupings. We
propose two evaluation methods: F-measure [42] and match point.
4.3.1 F-measure
F-measure [42] is a well-known evaluation method for cluster analysis with
known cluster labels. The idea is to treat each cluster in C as the relevant set
of records for a query, and treat each cluster in Cg as the result of a query. The
clusters in C are called “natural clusters,” and those in Cg are called “query
clusters.”
For a natural cluster Ci in C and a query cluster Kj in Cg, let |Ci| and |Kj|
Table 2
The masked table for release, satisfying {〈QID1 =
{Education,Gender}, 4〉, 〈QID2 = {Gender,Age}, 11〉}
Rec ID Education Gender Age · · · Count
1-7 Junior Sec. ANY [1-37) · · · 7
8-12 11th ANY [1-37) · · · 5
13-16 12th ANY [37-99) · · · 4
17-26 Bachelors ANY [37-99) · · · 10
27-34 Grad School ANY [37-99) · · · 8
Total: · · · 34
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Table 3
The masked labelled table for evaluation
Rec ID Education Gender Age · · · Class Count
1-7 Junior Sec. ANY [1-37) · · · K1 7
8-12 11th ANY [1-37) · · · K1 5
13-16 12th ANY [37-99) · · · K2 4
17-26 Bachelors ANY [37-99) · · · K2 10
27-34 Grad School ANY [37-99) · · · K2 8
Total: 34
denote the number of records in Ci and Kj respectively, let nij denote the
number of records contained in both Ci and Kj, let |T | denote the total num-









read as the fraction of relevant records among the records retrieved by the
query.
F (Ci, Kj) =
2 ∗Recall(Ci, Kj) ∗ Precision(Ci, Kj)
Recall(Ci, Kj) + Precision(Ci, Kj)
(8)
F (Ci, Kj) measures the quality of query cluster Kj in describing the natural
cluster Ci, by the harmonic mean of Recall and Precision.
The success of preserving a natural cluster Ci is measured by the “best” query
cluster Kj for Ci, i.e., Kj maximizes F (Ci, Kj). We measure the quality of Cg
using the weighted sum of such maximum F-measures for all natural clusters.





|T |maxKj∈Cg{F (Ci, Kj)} (9)
Note that F (Cg) is in the range [0,1]. A larger value indicates a higher simi-
larity between the two cluster structures generated from the raw data and the
masked data, i.e., better preserved cluster quality.
Example 4.3 Table 3 shows a cluster structure with k = 2 produced from
the masked Table 2. The first 12 records are grouped into K1, and the rest
are grouped into K2. By comparing with the raw cluster structure in Table 1,
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Table 4
The similarity of two cluster structures
Clusters in Clusters in Table 3




The F-measure computed from Table 4
F (Ci,Kj) K2 K1
C1 0.88 0.12
C2 0.17 0.8
we can see that, among the 21 records in C1, 19 remain in the same cluster
K2 and only 2 are sent to a different cluster. C2 has a similar pattern. Table 4
shows the comparison between the clusters of the two structures, and Table 5
shows the F-measure. The overall F-measure is:
F (Cg) = |C1||T | × F (C1, K2) + |C2||T | × F (C2, K1)
= 21
34
× 0.88 + 13
34
× 0.8 = 0.85.
F-measure is an efficient evaluation method, but it considers only the best
query cluster Kj for each natural cluster Ci; therefore, it does not capture
the quality of other query clusters and may not provide a full picture of the
similarity between two cluster structures. Thus, we propose an alternative eval-
uation method, called match point, to directly measure the preserved cluster
structure.
4.3.2 Match Point
Intuitively, two cluster structures C and Cg are similar if two objects that be-
long to the same cluster in C remain in the same cluster in Cg, and if two objects
that belong to different clusters in C remain in different clusters in Cg. To re-
flect the intuition, we build two square matricesMatrix(C) andMatrix(Cg) to
represent the grouping of records in cluster structures C and Cg, respectively.
The square matrices are |T |-by-|T |, where |T | is the total number of records
in table T . The (i, j)th element in Matrix(C) (or Matrix(Cg)) has value 1 if
the ith record and the jth record in the raw table T (or the masked table T ∗)
are in the same cluster; 0 otherwise. Then, we define match point 3 to be the
3 We acknowledge the anonymous reviewer of DKE for suggesting this intuitive
evaluation method.
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|T |2 , (10)
where Mij is 1 if the (i, j)
th element in Matrix(C) and Matrix(Cg) have the
same value; 0 otherwise. Note that match point is in the range of [0,1]. A
larger value indicates a higher similarity between the two cluster structures
generated from the raw data and the masked data, i.e., better preserved cluster
quality.
Example 4.4 Continue from Example 4.3. Among the 5 records with Rec
IDs 8-12, 2 records are not in its original clusters in Cg. Among the 24 records





We discuss some open issues and possible improvements in our proposed pri-
vacy framework for cluster analysis. Then, we present an analysis on the effi-
ciency of the TDR algorithm.
4.4.1 Open Issues and Improvements
Refer to Figure 2. One open issue is the choice of clustering algorithms em-
ployed by the data holder in Step 1. Each clustering algorithm has its own
search bias or preference. Experimental results in Section 5 suggest that if the
same clustering algorithm is employed in Step 1 and Step 3, then the cluster
structure from the masked data is very similar to the raw cluster structure;
otherwise, the cluster structure in the masked data could not even be ex-
tracted. We suggest two methods for choosing clustering algorithms.
Recipient oriented. This approach minimizes the difference generated if the
recipient had applied her clustering algorithm to both the raw data and the
masked data. It requires the clustering algorithm in Step 1 to be the same,
or to use the same bias, as the recipient’s algorithm. We can implement this
approach in a similar way as for determining the cluster number: either the
recipient provides her clustering algorithm information, or the data holder
releases one version of masked data for each popular clustering algorithm,
leaving the choice to the recipient. Refer to the earlier discussion in Section 4.1
for handling potential privacy breaches caused by multiple releases.
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Structure oriented. This approach focuses on preserving the “true” cluster
structure in the data instead of matching the recipient’s choice of algorithms.
Indeed, if the recipient chooses a bad clustering algorithm, matching her choice
may minimize the difference but is not helpful for cluster analysis. This ap-
proach aims at preserving the “truthful” cluster structure by employing a
robust clustering algorithm in Step 1 and Step 3. Dave and Krishnapuram [9]
specified a list of requirements in order for a clustering algorithm to be robust.
The principle is that “the performance of a robust clustering algorithm should
not be affected significantly by small deviations from the assumed model and
it should not deteriorate drastically due to noise and outliers.” If the recipient
employs a less robust clustering algorithm, it may not find the “true” cluster
structure. This approach is suitable for the case in which the recipient’s pref-
erence is unknown at the time of data release, and the data holder wants to
publish only one or a small number of versions. Optionally, the data holder
may release the class labels in Step 1 as a sample clustering solution. In the
rest of this section, we discuss the anonymization in Step 2 and the evaluation
in Step 4.
Our study in TDR focuses mainly on single-dimensional global recoding, de-
fined in Section 3. LeFevre et al. [20][21] presented alternative masking op-
erations, such as local recoding and multidimensional recoding, for achieving
k-anonymity and its extended privacy notions. For example, in Table 1 the
Bachelors with Rec ID# 17-22 can be generalized to University, while the
Bachelors with Rec ID# 23-26 can remain ungeneralized. Compared with
global recoding, local recoding and multidimensional recoding are more flex-
ible and result in less distortion; therefore, they may further improve the
preserved cluster quality in the anonymous data. Nonetheless, it is important
to note that local recoding and multidimensional recoding may cause a data
exploration problem: most standard data mining methods treat Bachelors
and University as two independent values; but, in fact, they are not. Build-
ing a decision tree from such a generalized table may result in two branches,
Bachelors → class1 and University → class2. It is unclear which branch
should be used to classify a new Bachelor. Though very important, this as-
pect of data utility has been ignored by all works that employed the local
recoding and multidimensional recoding schemes. Data produced by global
generalization and global suppression does not suffer from this data explo-
ration problem.
4.4.2 Efficiency of TDR
Let T ∗l [v] denote the set of records containing value v in a masked table T
∗
l .
Each iteration in TDR involves two types of work. The first type accesses data
records in T ∗l [Best] or T
∗
l [⊥] for updating the anonymity counts a[qidi] and
entropy. If Best is an interval, an extra step is required for determining the
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optimal split for each child interval c in child(Best). This requires making a
scan on records in T ∗l [c], which is a subset of T
∗
l [Best]. To determine a split,
T ∗l [c] has to be sorted, which can be an expensive operation. Fortunately,
resorting T ∗l [c] is unnecessary for each iteration because its superset T
∗
l [Best]
is already sorted. Thus, this type of work involves one scan of the records
being refined in each iteration. The second type of work computes Score(x)
for the candidates x ∈ 〈∪Cutj,∪Intj,∪Intj〉 without accessing data records.
For a table with m attributes and each taxonomy tree with at most p nodes,
the number of such x is at most m × p. This computation makes use of the
maintained counts and does not access data records. Let h be the maximum
number of times that a value in a record will be refined. For an attribute with
a taxonomy tree, h is bounded by the height of the taxonomy tree, and for an
attribute without a taxonomy tree, h is bounded by 1 (that is, a suppressed
value is refined at most once). In the whole computation, each record will be
refined at most m × h times and, therefore, accessed at most m × h times
because only refined records are accessed. Since m × h is a small constant,
independent of the table size, the TDR algorithm is linear in the table size.
Our current implementation assumes that the qid groups fit in memory. Often,
this assumption is valid because the qid groups are much smaller than the
original table. If the qid groups do not fit in the memory, we can store some
qid groups on disk in the process of TDR, if necessary. Favorably, the memory
is used to keep only qid groups that are smaller than the page size to avoid
fragmentation of disk pages. A nice property of TDR is that the qid groups that
cannot be further refined (that is, on which there is no candidate refinement)
can be discarded, and only some statistics for them need to be kept. This
likely applies to small qid groups in memory; therefore, the memory demand
is unlikely to build up.
5 Experimental Study
In this section, our objectives are to:
(1) study the loss of cluster quality for achieving various anonymity require-
ments;
(2) verify that the cluster-quality in the masked data produced by our cluster-
oriented anonymization method is better than the cluster quality in the
masked data produced by some general purpose anonymization method
without a specific usage of data analysis;
(3) verify that the employment of multiple QIDs relaxes the anonymity re-
quirement and, therefore, improves the cluster quality;
(4) study the effects on cluster quality when the data recipient and the data
holder use different clustering algorithms; and
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(5) evaluate the efficiency and scalability on large data sets of the proposed
anonymization method.
We employ the CLUTO-2.0 Clustering Toolkit [17], in particular, bisecting
k-means [18] and basic k-means [26], to generate cluster structures in Step 1
and Step 3 (refer to Section 4 and Figure 2). These two clustering algorithms
are chosen due to their popularity and wide applicability to different clustering
problems [35][36][38]. We first give a brief description of both clustering algo-
rithms. Basic k-means is a partitioning clustering algorithm. The general idea
is to position k points in the space represented by the records. These k points
represent the initial cluster centroid. Then, assign each record to the cluster
that has the closest centroid, recompute the centroid, and repeat the computa-
tion of centroid and assignment of records until the centroid no longer moves.
Bisecting k-means [18] is a divisive hierarchical clustering algorithm. It starts
with a single cluster of all records and first selects a cluster (e.g., the largest
cluster) to split. Then, it utilizes basic k-means to form two sub-clusters and
repeats until the desired number of clusters is reached.
A naive approach to the studied privacy problem is to ignore the cluster struc-
ture and simply employ general purpose anonymization methods [20][33] to
anonymize the data. So, one objective of the experiment is to compare the
cluster quality, in terms of overall F-measure and match point, of our cluster
quality-guided anonymization approach with the general purpose anonymiza-
tion approach. To ensure a fair comparison, both approaches employ the same
modified TDR anonymization method but with different Score functions. The
overall F-measure and match point produced by different Score functions are
labelled as follows:
• clusterFM and clusterMP denote the overall F-measure and match point,
respectively, of the cluster structures before and after masking by our cluster
structure-guided anonymization approach, whereas the Score function is
specified in Equation 1.
• distortFM and distortMP denote the overall F-measure and match point
of the cluster structures before and after masking by the general purpose
anonymization approach that aims at minimizing distortion [34]. The intu-
ition is to charge one unit of distortion for each occurrence of value gen-
eralized to its parent value or suppressed to ⊥. Following such intuition,
at each iteration, the Score function biases to refine on a value v that re-
sults in the maximum number of refined records in table T ∗l . Specifically,
Score(v) = |T ∗l [v]|, where |T ∗l [v]| is number of records containing v in T ∗l .
Note, this Score function ignores the cluster structure.
Given the above objective measures, we can compare the two anonymization
approaches in terms of cluster quality. clusterFM−distortFM
distortFM
calculates the benefit
in F-measure of our cluster quality-guided anonymization over the general
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purpose anonymization. Similarly, clusterMP−distortMP
distortMP
calculates the benefit in
match point of our cluster quality-guided benefit over the general purpose
benefit. In this section, the term “benefit” refers to such ratios.
We are also interested in computing the loss in cluster quality due to masking.
Both the overall F-measure and the match point equal to 1 if the two cluster
structures, before and after the masking, are identical; therefore, 1−clusterFM
1
=
1 − clusterFM calculates the cost for achieving anonymity measured in F-
measure. Similarly, 1− clusterMP calculates the cost for achieving anonymity
measured in match point. In this section, the term “cost” refers to such dif-
ferences.
All experiments were conducted on an Intel Pentium IV 2.6-GHz PC with
1-Gbyte RAM. We adopted two publicly available real-life data sets, Adult
and Japanese Credit Screen (a.k.a. CRX), from the University of California,
Irvine (UCI) machine learning repository [30]. Extensive experimental results
for Adult and CRX are presented in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, respectively.
We summarize the results in Section 5.3.
5.1 The Adult Data Set
The Adult data set contains real-life census data. It is a de facto benchmark for
testing anonymization algorithms, previously used in [4][11][12][16][20][22][23]
[24][25][43][44][45][46]. After removing records with missing values, we have
45,222 records. Every record represents an individual in the United States. The
data set is intended for the purpose of classification analysis, so we dropped
the class attribute, but kept the 6 continuous attributes and 8 categorical
attributes; see Table 6 for their description. All 14 attributes are used in cluster
analysis. We used discretization and generalization to mask the continuous
and categorical attributes. The taxonomy trees for categorical attributes are
adopted from [12]. The continuous attributes are normalized as a standard
preprocessing step in many clustering algorithms. The taxonomy trees for
continuous attributes are dynamically generated by our TDR algorithm.
In Section 5.1.1, we present the results for the scenario called homogeneous
clustering, where the same clustering algorithm is applied in both Step 1 and
Step 3. In Section 5.1.2, we present the results for the scenario called hetero-
geneous clustering, where different clustering algorithms are applied in Step 1
and Step 3. In Section 5.1.3, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed method.
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Table 6
The attributes for Adult data set
Attribute Type Numerical Range
# of Leaves # of Levels
Age (Ag) continuous 17 - 90
Capital-gain (Cg) continuous 0 - 99999
Capital-loss (Cl) continuous 0 - 4356
Education-num (En) continuous 1 - 16
Final-weight (Fw) continuous 13492 - 1490400
Hours-per-week (Hw) continuous 1 - 99
Education (Ed) categorical 16 5
Marital-status (Ms) categorical 7 4
Native-country (Nc) categorical 40 5
Occupation (Oc) categorical 14 3
Race (Ra) categorical 5 3
Relationship (Re) categorical 6 3
Sex (Se) categorical 2 2
Work-class (Wc) categorical 8 5
5.1.1 Homogenous Clustering
Homogeneous clustering refers to the scenario in which the same clustering
algorithm is applied in both Step 1 and Step 3. In the scenario it models, the
recipient applies the same clustering algorithm as the one used by the data
holder. We first evaluate the cost and benefit, in terms of cluster quality, of em-
ploying our proposed method for anonymity requirements with a single QID.
Next, we study how the cluster quality is influenced by the anonymity thresh-
old and QID size. Then, we study cluster quality for anonymity requirement
with multiple QIDs.
Single QID: Observation 3.1 implies that for the same anonymity threshold,
a single QID is always more restrictive than breaking it into multiple QIDs.
We first consider the case of a single QID. To ensure that the QID contains
attributes that have an impact on clustering, we use the C4.5 classifier [32]
to rank the attributes with respect to the raw cluster labels. The top rank
attribute is the attribute at the top of the C4.5 decision tree. Then, we re-
move the top attribute and repeat this process to determine the rank of other
attributes. In our experiments, Top9 denotes the anonymity requirement in
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(e) k = 10
Fig. 3. Overall F-measure for homogeneous clustering on Adult
pend on the raw cluster structure, which depends on the cluster number and
clustering algorithm for extraction. For example, for k-means algorithm with
k = 6, Top9 is En,Nc,Ms,Oc,Ed,Re,Ag,Ra, Se, ranked in that order.
Benefit: Figure 3(a) shows the averaged clusterFM and distortFM over anonymity
thresholds 5 ≤ h ≤ 100 for basic k-means. The benefit of our cluster quality-
guided anonymization over the general purpose anonymization spans from
24% to 125% for the number of clusters k = 2, 6, 10. To show the benefit is
statistically significant, we conducted a one-tail t-test on the 20 pairs of test
cases on 5 ≤ h ≤ 100. The p-values for k = 2, 6, 10 are 5.02E-7, 8.97E-25,
6.14E-14, respectively. Figure 3(b) shows the results for the same experimen-
tal setting for bisecting k-means. The benefit spans from 34% to 66%. The
p-values for k = 2, 6, 10 are 7.44E-14, 2.55E-6, 4.72E-7, respectively, showing
that the benefit is statistically significant at α = 5% and the benefit is unlikely
to have occurred by chance.
Figure 4(a) shows the averaged clusterMP and distortMP over anonymity
thresholds 5 ≤ h ≤ 100 for basic k-means. The benefit spans from 28% to
85% for the number of clusters k = 2, 6, 10. The p-values for k = 2, 6, 10
are 7.94E-8, 3.72E-22, 1.67E-10, respectively. Figure 4(b) shows the results
for the same experimental setting for bisecting k-means. The benefit spans
from 5% to 32%. The p-values for k = 2, 6, 10 are 5.71E-34, 4.24E-5, 1.07E-8,
respectively, showing that the benefit is statistically significant at α = 5%.
Both measures in overall F-measure and match point suggest that our cluster
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(e) k = 10
Fig. 4. Match point for homogeneous clustering on Adult
the general purpose anonymization on the Adult data set.
Cost: Consider Figures 3(a)-3(b) and Figures 4(a)-4(b) again. The averaged
cost, measured in overall F-measure, for achieving a given anonymity require-
ment spans from 2% to 20% for basic k-means and bisecting k-means at cluster
numbers k = 2 and k = 6. The averaged cost, measured in match point, spans
from 9% to 23% for basic k-means and bisecting k-means at cluster num-
bers k = 2, 6, 10. In general the loss of cluster quality is mild and the raw
cluster structure has been preserved. There is an exception. For example, the
cost increases to 33% in Figure 3(b) at k = 10, indicating that the number
of clusters k plays an important role in the preserved cluster quality. It also
strengthens the importance of the evaluation phase (Step 3 and Step 4) in our
framework because it provides the data holder an opportunity to evaluate the
cluster quality before releasing the data. If the loss is large, e.g., at k = 10,
the data holder may consider releasing an alternative version with a different
number of clusters k, which usually is not a hard constraint. The problem of
determining the cluster number is part of cluster analysis, not a new issue in
our anonymization problem.
Sensitivity to anonymity threshold h: Figures 3(c)-3(e) and Figures 4(c)-
4(e) plot the clusterFM, distortFM, clusterMP, and distortMP of anonymity
thresholds 5 ≤ h ≤ 100 at k = 2, 6, 10 for basic k-means and bisecting k-
means. Each data point in the figures represent one test case. We made two
observations from these figures.
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Table 7
The similarity of two cluster structures (h = 120 and k = 6)
Clusters in Clusters in Masked T ∗l
Unmodified Tl K2 K5 K1 K3 K6 K4
C1 12655 0 0 0 13 1
C2 0 6198 0 0 19 22
C3 0 0 6513 0 0 59
C4 0 0 0 4239 386 0
C5 0 0 0 3846 3171 0
C6 0 0 0 0 0 8100
(1) Both clusterFM and clusterMP span narrowly with a difference less than
0.2, suggesting that the cluster quality is not sensitive to the increase of
anonymity threshold. The result also suggests that both basic and bisect-
ing k-means are robust enough to recapture the clustering structures from
the generalized data with different anonymity thresholds h and numbers
of clusters k. We examined the masked data closely and found that, for
example, the masked data at h = 20 is identical to the masked data at
h = 70 in Figure 3(c), meaning that the same masked version has room
to satisfy a broad range for anonymity thresholds h.
(2) Both overall F-measure and match point do not decrease monotonically
with respect to the increase of h because both the TDR anonymization
algorithm and the clustering algorithms do not aim at identifying the
global optimal solution. As a result, in some test cases, the masked data
with higher anonymity threshold h may result in higher preserved cluster
quality in the evaluation. However, if the anonymity threshold is increased
to some unreasonable range, say h = 5000, then the cluster quality will be
completely destroyed and both overall F-measure and match point will
drop significantly to below 0.1. Thus, in general, there is a trend that
the clustering quality degrades as the anonymity threshold increases, but
the trade-off is not obvious when h is relatively small (e.g., h ≤ 100)
compared to the number of records (e.g., 45,222 records). We will revisit
the influence of anonymity threshold in the experiment on CRX, which
is a smaller data set, in Section 5.2.
In addition to F-measure and match point, we also manually examined the
cluster structures generated from the raw data and from the masked data in
the case of h = 120 and k = 6 as shown in Table 7. The overall F-measure is
0.90 and the match point is 0.97. Note that the cluster labels are arbitrarily
named. Among the 12,669 records in the natural cluster C1, 12,655 remain
together in the new cluster K2. So, C1 is almost perfectly preserved. The
natural cluster C5 is less preserved as its members are split between two new
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clusters.
A closer look at the masked data reveals that among the nine top ranked
attributes, four are generalized to a different degree of granularity, and five,
namely Nc (ranked 2nd), Oc (ranked 4th), Ed (ranked 5th), Re (ranked 6th),
and Ra (ranked 8th), are generalized to the topmost value ANY. Even for
this drastic masking, the overall F-measure and match point remain at 0.90
and 0.97, respectively. This suggests that there is much room for masking
within the constraint of preserving the cluster structure. Such room comes
from the fact that some values are unnecessarily specific for cluster analysis,
and masking them to less specific values does not affect the cluster structure.
Our approach seizes the opportunity provided by this flexibility for masking
identifying information.
We also conducted some experiments to study how the structure of a taxonomy
tree could influence the generalization on a categorical attribute and the over-
all cluster quality. In general, a taller taxonomy tree increases the flexibility of
generalization because domain values have more opportunities to be general-
ized into different granularity. As a result, masking is reduced and the overall
cluster quality is improved. However, data could become hard to interpret if a
taxonomy tree is unreasonably tall. For the dynamically generated taxonomy
tree in continuous attributes, we also examined the split points computed by
information gain. Figure 5 shows the dynamically generated taxonomy tree for
Education-num (En). The split point at 13 (the years of education, not age)




























































































































































Fig. 7. MultiQID vs. SingleQID for k = 6 on Adult
Sensitivity to QID size: Figure 6 studies the influence of QID size on the
preserved cluster quality. Figure 6(a) has two portions. The left and right por-
tions, separated by a vertical dashed line, show the averaged overall F-measure
over anonymity thresholds 5 ≤ h ≤ 100 for basic k-means and bisecting k-
means, respectively, at k = 6 with QID size from 3 attributes (Top3) to 9
attributes (Top9). Figure 6(b) shows the averaged match point for the same
experimental setting. Both overall F-measure and match point exhibit a simi-
lar pattern and suggest that as the QID increase, the preserved cluster quality
decreases because more attributes are included for masking. It is interesting
to note that as QID size decreases, the benefit of the cluster quality-guided
anonymization over the general purpose anonymization becomes smaller be-
cause the non-QID attributes dominate the clustering effect and, therefore,
diminish the difference between the two anonymization methods.
Multiple QIDs: To verify the claim that multi-QID anonymity requirements
can help reduce unnecessary masking, we compared the overall F-measure be-
tween a multi-QID requirement and the corresponding single QID require-
ment, where the QID is the union of the multiple QIDs. For example, a
requirement of 3 length-2 QIDs is
{〈{Ag, En}, h〉, 〈{Ag, Re}, h〉, 〈{Se, Hw}, h〉},
and the corresponding single QID requirement is
{〈{Ag, En, Re, Se, Hw}, h〉}.
We randomly generated 30 multi-QID requirements as follows. For each re-
quirement, we first determined the number of QIDs using the uniform prob-
ability distribution U [3, 7] (i.e., randomly drew a number between 3 and 7
where the probability of selecting each number was the same) and the length
of QIDs using U [2, 9]. For simplicity, all QIDs in the same requirement had
the same length and same threshold h. For each QID, we randomly selected
attributes according to the QID length from the 14 attributes. A repeating
QID was discarded.
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Figure 7 studies the effect on the preserved cluster quality between multi-QID,
denoted byMultiQID, and its corresponding singleQID, denoted by SingleQID.
Figure 7(a) has two portions. The left and right portions show the averaged
overall F-measure over the 30 randomly generated test cases described above
at h = 20, 50, 80 for basic k-means and bisecting k-means, respectively, where
k = 6. To show the difference between MultiQID and SingleQID is statistically
significant, we conducted a one-tail t-test on the 30 pairs of test cases. The
p-values for basic k-means at h = 20, 50, 80 are 4.20E-6, 9.27E-6, 2.27E-5,
respectively. The p-values for bisecting k-means at h = 20, 50, 80 are 2.05E-9,
2.49E-9, 6.94E-8, respectively. The difference between MultiQID and SingleQID
is statistically significant at α = 5%. Figure 7(b) shows the averaged match
point for the same experimental setting and exhibits similar results, so we omit
the explanation. Figure 7 suggests that a multi-QID anonymity requirement
generally results in higher cluster quality than its corresponding single QID
anonymity requirement.
5.1.2 Heterogeneous Clustering
Heterogeneous clustering refers to the case that different clustering algorithms
are applied in Step 1 and Step 3. It models the scenario that the data recip-
ient applies a clustering algorithm to the masked data that is different from
the one used by the data holder for masking the data. We applied bisecting
and basic k-means in Step 1 and Step 3 in two different orders, denoted by
(Basic KM→Bisecting KM ) and (Bisecting KM→Basic KM ), respectively,
in Figure 8. In both cases, compared to the homogenous clustering in Fig-
ures 3-4, there is a very severe drop on clusterFM and clusterMP. The drop
on clusterFM and clusterMP spans from 33% to 78%, and from 16% to 50%,
respectively. To explain the drops, we encoded two raw cluster structures sep-
arately using the two clustering methods (without any masking), and then
measured the overall F-measure and match point between the two raw cluster
structures, denoted by Raw Data in the figures. Because the drops on clus-
terFM and clusterMP of Raw Data are also severe, we can conclude that the
drops on (Basic KM→Bisecting KM ) and (Bisecting KM→Basic KM ) are
caused by the nature of heterogeneous clustering, not by the masking.
The above studies suggest that if the data recipient applies the same cluster-
ing algorithm as the one used by the data holder for masking the data, the
cluster structure obtained will be more similar to the raw cluster structure
because the second clustering could extract the embedded structure preserved
in the masked data. In contrast, if different clustering algorithms are used,
the structure preserved by masking may not be useful to the second clustering
due to a different search bias. This explains the significant drops in overall
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Fig. 9. Scalability (h = 50 and k = 6)
5.1.3 Efficiency and Scalability
We evaluated the efficiency and scalability of the TDR anonymization al-
gorithm, which is capable of masking continuous attributes and categorical
attributes with and without pre-specified taxonomy trees. For all previous ex-
periments on Adult, TDR takes at most 10 seconds to complete. Out of the 10
seconds, approximately 8 seconds are spent on reading data records from disk
and writing the masked data to disk. The actual processing time for masking
the data is relatively short.
The next experiment evaluates the scalability of TDR by adding some ran-
domly generated records to the Adult data set, which originally had 45,222
records. For each raw record r in Adult, we created α − 1 “variations” of r,
where α > 1 is the expansion scale. For each variation of r, we randomly
selected q attributes from ∪QIDi, where q has the uniform probability dis-
tribution U [1, | ∪ QIDj|], and replaced the values on the selected attributes
with values randomly drawn from the domain of the attributes. Together with
all raw records, the expanded data set had α × 45, 222 records. To provide
a precise evaluation, the runtime reported excludes the time for loading data
records from disk and the time for writing the masked data to disk.
Figure 9 depicts the runtime of TDR, using generalization and discretization,
for 200,000 to 1 million data records at the anonymity threshold h = 50 and
the cluster number k = 6 with two types of anonymity requirements. AllAttQID
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refers to the single QID having all 14 attributes. This is one of the most time-
consuming settings because of the large number of candidate refinements to
consider at each iteration. For TDR, the small anonymity threshold of h = 50
requires more iterations to reach a solution, hence more runtime, than a larger
threshold. TDR takes approximately 80 seconds to transform 1 million records.
In Figure 9, MultiQID refers to the average runtime over the 30 random multi-
QID requirements generated as described in Section 5.1.1 with h = 50 and
k = 6. Compared to AllAttQID, TDR becomes less efficient for handling multi-
QID because an anonymity requirement on multi-QID is a less restrictive con-
straint than the single QID anonymity requirement containing all attributes;
therefore, TDR has to perform more refinements to reach a local optimal so-
lution. The runtime of suppression on this expanded data set is roughly the
same as shown in Figure 9, so we omit the figure.
5.2 The Japanese Credit Screening (CRX) Data Set
The Japanese Credit Screening data set, also known as CRX, contains real-life
credit card applications. It was previously used in [45][46]. With the binary
class attribute removed, there are 6 continuous attributes and 9 categorical
attributes on 653 records. Every record represents a credit card application
of an individual in Japan. In the UCI repository, all values and attribute
names in CRX have been changed to meaningless symbols, e.g., A1 . . . A15.
The continuous attributes are normalized as a standard preprocessing step in
many clustering algorithms. No taxonomy trees are given for the categorical
attributes, so we use discretization and suppression to mask the continuous
and categorical attributes. All 15 attributes are used in cluster analysis.
Following the same experimental settings for Adult in Section 5.1, we present
the result of CRX below. In general, the result exhibits patterns similar to
those shown in Section 5.1 The only difference is that the cluster quality in
CRX is more sensitive to the increase of anonymity threshold h due to its
smaller data set size. We first present the results for the scenario of homoge-
nous clustering, followed by heterogeneous clustering.
5.2.1 Homogenous Clustering
We first evaluate the cost and benefit, in terms of cluster quality, of employing
our proposed method for anonymity requirements with single QID. Next, we
study how the cluster quality is influenced by the anonymity threshold and
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(e) k = 10
Fig. 10. Overall F-measure for homogeneous clustering on CRX
Single QID: For each test case, we used the same method described in Sec-
tion 5.1 to identify the top 9 most important attributes to form the anonymity
requirement, denoted by Top9.
Benefit: Figure 10(a) shows the averaged clusterFM and distortFM over
anonymity thresholds 5 ≤ h ≤ 100 for basic k-means. The benefit of our
cluster quality-guided anonymization over the general purpose anonymization
spans from 40% to 155% for the number of clusters k = 2, 6, 10. To show the
benefit is statistically significant, we conducted a one-tail t-test on the 20 pairs
of test cases from 5 ≤ h ≤ 100. The p-values for k = 2, 6, 10 are 2.24E-26,
4.67E-17, 1.40E-10, respectively. Figure 10(b) shows the results for the same
experimental setting for bisecting k-means. It is interesting to note that the
raw cluster structure is perfectly preserved at k = 2 for both clusterFM and
distortFM in all 20 test cases of anonymity threshold 5 ≤ h ≤ 100, so the
benefit and the cost are 0. The benefit at k = 6 and k = 10 are 45% and 57%,
respectively. The p-values for k = 10 and k = 10 are 4.25E-9 and 1.11E-10,
respectively, showing that the benefit is statistically significant at α = 5%;
the benefit is unlikely to have occurred by chance.
Figure 11(a) shows the averaged clusterMP and distortMP over anonymity
thresholds 5 ≤ h ≤ 100 for basic k-means. The benefit spans from 9% to
60% for the number of clusters k = 2, 6, 10. The p-values for k = 2, 6, 10
are 1.67E-16, 8.50E-14, 1.81E-6, respectively. Figure 11(b) shows the results
for the same experimental setting for bisecting k-means. The benefit at k =
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Fig. 11. Match point for homogeneous clustering on CRX
k = 10 are 1.04E-9 and 1.06E-11, respectively, showing that the benefit is
statistically significant at α = 5%. The results suggest that that our cluster
quality-guided anonymization generally preserves better cluster quality than
the general purpose anonymization on CRX.
Cost: Consider Figures 10(a)-10(b) and Figures 11(a)-11(b) again. The av-
eraged cost, measured in overall F-measure, for achieving a given anonymity
requirement spans from 0% to 23% for basic k-means and bisecting k-means
at cluster numbers k = 2 and k = 6. The averaged cost, measured in match
point, spans from 0% to 20% for basic k-means and bisecting k-means at
cluster numbers k = 2, 6, 10. The results suggest that the cost is mild and
support the claim that the cluster structure can be preserved for restrictive
anonymity requirements. However, the cost increases to 30% when k = 10 in
Figure 10(a). Thus, it strengthens our claim that it is important to evaluate
the cluster quality before releasing the data.
Sensitivity to anonymity threshold h: Figures 10(c)-10(e) and Figures 11(c)-
11(e) plot the clusterFM, distortFM, clusterMP, and distortMP for basic k-
means and bisecting k-means with anonymity thresholds 5 ≤ h ≤ 100 at
k = 2, 6, 10. From the figures, we noted that at k = 6 and k = 10, both clus-
terFM and clusterMP are more sensitive to the increase of anonymity thresh-
old h, and the preserved cluster quality generally degrades as h increases. The
trade-off between cluster quality and anonymity is more obvious in CRX than
in Adult because the data set size of CRX (653 records) is much smaller than
the data set size of Adult (45,222 records); therefore, increasing the anonymity
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threshold h, for example, from 20 to 80, requires more maskings in CRX but
not in Adult. The data set size influences the required masking for achieving
a given anonymity requirement and indirectly affects the cluster quality.
Sensitivity to QID size: Figure 12 illustrates how the QID size affects the
preserved cluster quality. As the result is similar to the result in Figure 6 on
Adult, we omit the explanation here.
Multiple QIDs: Figure 13 shows the effect on the preserved cluster qual-
ity between MultiQID and SingleQID. Figure 13(a) has two portions. The left
and right portions show the averaged overall F-measure over the 30 randomly
generated test cases described in Section 5.1 at h = 20, 50, 80 for basic k-
means and bisecting k-means, respectively, where k = 6. The p-values for
basic k-means at h = 20, 50, 80 are 2.12E-9, 6.25E-6, 3.12E-3, respectively.
The p-values for bisecting k-means at h = 20, 50, 80 are 1.03E-12, 2.49E-12,
1.42E-12, respectively. Figure 13(b) shows the averaged match point for the
same experimental setting. The difference between MultiQID and SingleQID
is statistically significant at α = 5%. Although the result suggests that an
anonymized data set satisfying a multi-QID anonymity requirement gener-
ally yields higher cluster quality than an anonymized data set satisfying its
corresponding single QID anonymity requirement, the difference is not very
large on CRX.
5.2.2 Heterogeneous Clustering
Figure 14 depicts the averaged overall F-measure and averaged match point
over anonymity thresholds 0 ≤ h ≤ 100 for heterogeneous clustering on CRX
at cluster numbers k = 2, 6, 10. Compared to homogenous clustering, there
is a very severe drop on both the overall F-measure and the match point for
(Bisecting KM→Basic KM ). We notice that the drop is caused by heteroge-
neous clustering, not by masking, because the overall F-measure and match
point also show severe drops on Raw Data, which does not involve masking.
































































































































































































Fig. 14. Heterogeneous clustering on CRX
for (Bisecting KM→Basic KM ), implying that bisecting k-means can extract
the cluster structure encoded by basic k-means in the masked data. Interest-
ingly, the overall F-measure for (Bisecting KM→Basic KM ) is even better
than the overall F-measure on Raw Data because the masking removes some
overly specific information (i.e., noise) from the data.
5.3 Summary
These experiments verified the claim that the proposed approach of converting
the anonymity problem for cluster analysis to the counterpart problem for
classification analysis is effective. This is demonstrated by the preservation
of most of the cluster structure in the raw data after masking identifying
information for a broad range of anonymity requirements. The experimental
results also suggest that our cluster quality-guided anonymization can preserve
better cluster structure than the general purpose anonymization.
The experiments demonstrated the cluster quality with respect to the variation
of anonymity thresholds, QID size, and number of clusters. In general, the
cluster quality degrades as the anonymity threshold increases. This trend is
more obvious if the data set size is small or if h is relatively large, e.g., h =
5000. The cluster quality degrades as the QID size increases. The cluster
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quality exhibits no obvious trend with respect to the number of clusters, as
the natural number of clusters is data dependent.
The experiments confirmed that the specification of the multi-QID anonymity
requirement helps avoid unnecessary masking and, therefore, preserves more
of the cluster structure. However, if the data recipient and the data holder
employ different clustering algorithms, then there is no guarantee that the
encoded raw cluster structure can be extracted. Thus, in practice, it is impor-
tant for the data holder to validate the cluster quality, using the evaluation
methods proposed in our framework, before releasing the data. Finally, exper-
iments suggest that the proposed anonymization approach is highly efficient
and scalable for single QID, but less efficient for multi-QID.
6 Extension: Beyond Anonymity
The above approach provides a flexible framework that makes use of existing
solutions as “plug-in” components. These include the cluster analysis in Steps
1 and 3, the anonymization in Step 2, and the evaluation in Step 4. For ex-
ample, instead of using the proposed TDR algorithm, the data holder has the
option to perform the anonymization by employing one of the genetic algo-
rithms [16], top-down specialization [12], or InfoGain Mondrian [22]. None of
them can perform all three types of masking operations discussed in Section 3,
so some modification is necessary.
This paper focuses on preventing the privacy threats caused by sensitive record
linkage, but the framework can also prevent sensitive attribute linkage by
adopting different anonymization algorithms and achieving other privacy re-
quirements, such as `-diversity [25] and confidence bounding [45][46], discussed
in Section 2. The extension requires modification of the Score or cost functions
in these algorithms to bias on refinements or maskings that can distinguish
class labels. The framework can also adopt other evaluation methods, such
as entropy [37], or any ad-hoc methods defined by the data holder. For fu-
ture work, we are interested in building a visualization tool to allow the data
holder to adjust the parameters, such as the number of clusters and anonymity
thresholds, and visualize their influence on the clusters interactively.
7 Conclusions
We studied the problem of releasing person-specific data for cluster analy-
sis while protecting privacy. The proposed solution is to mask unnecessarily
specific information into a less specific but semantically consistent version,
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so that person-specific identifying information is masked but essential cluster
structure remains. The major challenge is the lack of class labels that could
be used to guide the masking process. Our main contribution is a general
framework for converting this problem into the counterpart problem for clas-
sification analysis so that the masking process can be properly guided. The
key idea is to encode the original cluster structure into the class label of data
records and subsequently preserve the class labels for the corresponding clas-
sification problem. The experimental results verified the effectiveness of this
approach.
We also studied several practical issues arising from applying this approach
in a real-life data publishing scenario. These include how the choices of clus-
tering algorithms, number of clusters, anonymity threshold, and size and type
of quasi-identifiers can affect the effectiveness of this approach, and how to
evaluate the effectiveness in terms of cluster quality. These studies lead to the
recommendation of two strategies for choosing the clustering algorithm in the
masking process, each having a different focus. The contribution in this paper
provides a useful framework of secure data sharing for the purpose of cluster
analysis.
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